As the English Devolution and Empowerment Bill makes its passage through Parliament soon to become law, the issue of holding directly elected Mayor’s to account is topical.
The mayoral model in local government was piloted in Lewisham and the London borough made preparatory plans as early as 1998. The policy was seen as a beacon of new Labour. Promises were made to have a more visible leadership and clear lines of accountability. Much of the discourse has been focussed on the powers of the person holding the position of mayor.
However, less discussed is the need for formal scrutiny of the mayor and the executive decisions taken.
In Lewisham the debate was fierce and controversial. The result was a settlement that promised a ‘parity of esteem’ between executive power and formal scrutiny. Indeed, the lack of achieving this has been a constant refrain ever since. A quick look at the evidence to the House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee enquiry into the effectiveness of local authority overview and scrutiny committees confirms this. Their full report is here.
Good governance depends on checks and balances. Scrutiny can improve the decisions taken and increase understanding why a particular course has been taken. Not only this the process can build a consensus on the path chosen whatever the party colours of the executive mayor or scrutineers – if done well.
In a recent article by Patrick Seyd, an eminent academic the debate has resurfaced. His article and my letter in response is reproduced below:
I have read this article: ‘As metro mayors gain power, Labour must tighten political accountability’ with interest.
An initial thought is that I can remember when the creation of a mayoral system was being developed and discussed within the Labour Party.
Key considerations acknowledged the benefits of strong and visible leadership provided by an identifiable person in the form of a directly elected mayor.
However, the checks and balances provided within the system needed to be reviewed too. These required strengthening to justify a mayoral model.
A key feature of this was to state clearly that the Scrutiny function should have ‘parity of esteem’.
Furthermore, there should be a separation of powers between the executive and scrutiny functions.
In local government the separation of powers has been blurred. An example of this is the inclusion of cabinet members on Planning Committees. More hybrid functions have been added.
Increasingly, there has been a dilution of power between Scrutiny and Executive. The requirements to respect non-executive functions can be undermined by lack of resources, for example.
This can lead to a more authoritarian approach over time.
Developments such as local assemblies and other measures for public participation are subjected to budget constraints and cuts. This can inadvertently further concentrate power.
In the piece there is a reference to the current reporting mechanism for mayors in the Labour Party’s rule book.
The NEC has over the years has reviewed and issued guidance on this and made rule changes.
An audit of those changes may be beneficial now. It may reveal how we got to the weaker system and suggest how we strengthen proper scrutiny and accountability in the Party and more widely?
Alan Hall